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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Background:  The  decision  by  the  UK  government  to leave  the  European  Union  comes  at a time  when  parts
of the  UK  are  experiencing  a marked  rise  in  reported  gun and  knife  crimes.  The health  effects  of  Brexit
will  have  serious  consequences  as to how  the UK  tackles  this  upsurge  in drug-related  crime.
Health  policy  processes:  The  UK’s  future  participation  with  the EU’s  specialised  agencies  will  depend  on  the
detail of  any  agreement  reached  on  future  collaboration  with  the  EU  and  its  drug  agency,  the  EMCDDA.
Context:  The  EMCDDA  provides  the  EU  and  its Member  States  with  a factual  overview  of  European  drug
problems  and  a solid  evidence  base  to support  debates  on  drugs  policies.  It also  supports  early  warning
initiatives  and  coordinates  measures  at national  and  supranational  levels  with  Europol  and  supranational
enforcement  agencies.
Expected  outcomes:  While  these  arrangements  might  continue  throughout  any  transition  period,  those
working  within  the sector  require  guidance  and  assurances  from  the  British  government  about  its  long-ublic health term  intentions  after  any  transition.
Conclusions:  The  scale  of collaboration  between  the UK  and  European  institutions  is  extensive.  It is not
clear  how  this  might  be replicated  after  Brexit.  Yet  an  alternative  framework  of collaboration  between
the  UK  and  the  EU  is  clearly  needed  to facilitate  shared  and  agreed  approaches  to  data  sharing  and  drug
surveillance  after  Brexit.
© 2019  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC. Background
The decision by the UK government to leave the European Union
EU) comes at a time when parts of the UK are experiencing a
arked rise in reported gun and knife crimes, including many
atalities [1–4]. The health effects of Brexit have attracted grow-
ng, if belated, attention with concerns about the supply of health
orkers, medicines, and radioisotopes with many other areas being
nder recognised. As we  argue here, one is the UK’s ability to tackle
his upsurge in drug-related crime. This is an issue in the context
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration between Health
olicy and The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: aer56@medschl.cam.ac.uk (A. Roman-Urrestarazu).
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.04.005
168-8510/© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articl
.0/).BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
of Brexit because many of these crimes are linked to gangs ﬁght-
ing for control of parts of the illicit drug markets, particularly the
lucrative £11 billion cocaine market [1–3,5–9], with new models
of distribution involving recruitment of young people as couriers
(the “county lines” phenomenon), a development that police forces
link to increasing violence. While the EU plays an important role
in assembling the evidence and intelligence to tackle drug-related
harm linked to serious and organised crime, continued access to
its resources is not guaranteed after Brexit. This work is crucial in
reducing harm in for example cocaine use, that has been expanding
rapidly in many metropolitan areas. Bristol now ranks ﬁfth among
European cities for per capita use, surpassing Amsterdam, Berlin,
and Paris [4,10]. The effects of this expansion are visible in its con-
tribution to the rise in Drug-Related Deaths (DRDs) and its effects
on public health across the UK [11,12]. In 2015 there were 3,070
deaths classiﬁed as DRD, a 13% increase from 2014 (n = 2,717). Sev-
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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nty percent (2,162) were in England, 21% in Scotland (637), 5%
167) in Wales, and 3% (104) in Northern Ireland. Each of these
ountries experienced an increase between 2014 and 2015, with
3% more in England, 11% in Scotland, 14% in Wales, and 36% rise
n Northern Ireland [13]. This trend has continued across the UK.
or example, in 2017 there were 934 DRD’s registered in Scotland,
% (66) more than in 2016, according to ﬁgures released by the
ational Records of Scotland (NRS) with cocaine implicated in 176,
3 more than the previous high of 123 in 2016 [14]. In 2017 in
ngland and Wales there were 3,756 deaths related to drug poi-
oning [15]. These were the highest ﬁgures since the beginning of
he time series, and show a small increase in the 2016 level 2016
3,744 deaths) [15]. Looking ahead, there is concern about the grow-
ng use of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, with a 29% increase in
ortality linked to this drug in 2018, and the involvement of organ-
sed crime in the production and distribution of traditional drugs
nd new psychoactive substances (NPS) [12,16,17]. At a time when
rugs policy is under scrutiny and pressure for change is intense,
nformed debate is essential [18].
. The UK’s health policy processes in substance abuse
Traditionally, illicit drugs have been regarded as an issue for the
riminal justice system but that has been changing in recent years.
he Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has joined calls for
 public health, rather than criminal justice response to the issue
19]. She has drawn on the success of the Violence Reduction Unit
VRU) in Scotland, created in 2005, which confronted what was
hen the second highest murder rate in western Europe by estab-
ishing collaborations between education, social services, child and
dolescent mental health teams, and community groups [4,20–23].
ollaboration between the police and public health community is
ital [24] and depends on access to accurate and timely intelligence
n the market for illicit drugs, including street price, prevalence of
se, toxicity and poisonings, volumes of seizures, and the activi-
ies of organised crime networks. However, this local intelligence
s of limited value if it is not linked to information from abroad,
ncluding, crucially, other parts of Europe. The illicit drugs market
oes not respect international borders. Paradoxically, while there
ay be major challenges in importing legal drugs, such as insulin,
cross the UK’s newly enforced border arrangements, those who
ove illicit drugs have a wealth of experience in circumventing
ven the tightest border controls. Yet, as we now explain, Brexit
hreatens access to this vital information from elsewhere in Europe,
o it is essential that the United Kingdom’s government develop
lans for whatever happens next. This is especially important as
rganized crime networks might be encouraged by the exclusion
f the UK from other forms of European collaboration, including
he sharing of police intelligence and the European Arrest Warrant.
ational arguments on the risks, unintended consequence and ben-
ﬁts of structural changes in policy depend upon a functional and
unctioning monitoring system [18].
The UK’s future participation with the EU’s specialised agencies
ill depend on the detail of any agreement reached on future col-
aboration with the EU. [25] While most attention has been focused
n the departure of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) from
ondon, [26] several other EU agencies have important implications
or public health. In the context of this paper, the most important
s the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMCDDA).
Established in 1993, the EMCDDA has its headquarters in Lis-
on [27]. Its mandate derives from Regulation 1920/2006 of 12
ecember 2006 [28], which requires it to undertake certain activ-
ties in the areas of monitoring, establishing best practice and
nowledge exchange, maintaining information exchange systems,h Policy 123 (2019) 521–525
responding to NPS, and supporting policy at national and EU levels.
As with all EU agencies, its operation is based on European Treaties,
accountable to the European legislative institutions (Commission,
Council, and Parliament), and subject to the judicial oversight of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) [4,27,28]. These are all
provisions that, at the time of writing, the UK government has ruled
out of any future agreement. Thus, if the UK did wish to participate
in the future, it would ﬁrst have to accept these provisions, which
would cross some of the “red lines” the government has adopted so
far, and would then have to apply to join, most likely in some form
of associate arrangement such as for example Norway.
3. Context of the EU’s and EMCDDA drug policy framework
In practical terms, the EMCDDA provides the EU and its Mem-
ber States with a factual overview of European drug problems and
a solid evidence base to support debates on drugs policies. It also
supports early warning initiatives and coordinates measures at
national and supranational levels with Europol and supranational
enforcement agencies [27]. It offers policymakers the data they
need for drawing up informed drug laws and strategies and helps
professionals and practitioners working in the ﬁeld to identify best
practice and scope new areas of research.
The experience in Scotland shows why access to specialist
expertise and intelligence is important [21,22,29]. Evidence-based
interventions, based on locally conducted research, have been asso-
ciated with a marked reduction in incidents of assault-related sharp
force injury, with the reduction being greatest in street-based vio-
lence, typically involving young males, with a concurrent increase
in cases of domestic violence, which were not given the same atten-
tion. Illicit drugs ﬂow in convoluted and concealed pathways across
international borders, conveyed by sophisticated organised crime
networks [30,31]. The UK’s exclusion from its ongoing work with
EMCDDA, is a matter of concern, so ﬁnding ways to mitigate the
problems in a post-Brexit world is a crucial issue. The key to this
is the UK Focal Poin on Drugs and the alignment of its functions to
the broader work carried by EMCDDA.
The UK Focal Point on Drugs is based in Public Health Eng-
land (PHE) [13]. Working closely with the Home Ofﬁce, other UK
government departments, and government departments of the
other countries (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales), it provides
information to the EMCDDA and, in return, receives intelligence
on emerging developments across the EU compiled from the
Réseau Européen d Ínformation sur les Drogues et les Toxicomanies
(Reitox) surveillance network and other European agencies such as
Europol, Europe’s crime and intelligence-sharing agency, the Euro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the EMA
[13]. This information exchange is only possible because of existing
EU legislation, especially in the sphere of data protection.
4. Expected outcomes of brexit on drug policy
While these arrangements will continue throughout any tran-
sition period, assuming one is agreed, those working within the
sector require guidance and assurances from the British govern-
ment about its long-term intentions after any transition. There are
no grounds for complacency, as can be seen from the experience of
Denmark. After a 2015 referendum the Danish government opted
out of certain provisions on data sharing, including large parts of
the EU’s criminal justice and home affairs system. It was able to do
so after negotiating certain reservations in 1993 when these mea-
sures were brought within the ambit of the EU, having previously
been organized on an inter-governmental basis [32]. As a conse-
quence, Denmark lost access to Europol and was denied access
to EU-wide databases such as European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC)
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Table 1
Brexit Consequences by International Partnerships.
Partnerships Characteristics of the collaboration Institutions and participants
Possible Brexit consequences
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
EU institutions and
Agencies
The EMCDDA works closely with the European Union
institutions and agencies. This active cooperation means
that the Centre can provide constant assistance in deﬁning
a  drug strategy by supplying the Member States and the
Community with more reliable and comparable
information. In return, the Centre’s contributions in the
ﬁeld of information on drugs is broadly disseminated at
European level.
European Parliament, Council
of the European Union,
European Commission,
Europol, ECDC, EMA, Eurojust,
CEPOL
In case of a soft Brexit, EU membership
will cease but a collaboration
framework could be implemented to
continue current ongoing activities.
Membership of Europol and EU-wide
databases such as European
Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) for
ﬁnger-print information on asylum
seekers and illegal migrants, or the
European Criminal Records
Information System (ECRIS) for
third-country citizens will be difﬁcult.
Loss of all intelligence and data
sharing agreements currently in
place until new collaborative
framework are negotiated and
implemented.
International
partners
The  EMCDDA collaborates with numerous international
partners, often within the framework of formal
cooperation agreements supplemented by practical joint
work programmes. Cooperation ranges from the exchange
of  information and methodologies, via ad hoc technical
collaboration on speciﬁc supranational projects, to close
participation in the EMCDDA’s routine data collection
activities. The overall objective of this cooperation is to
develop a better understanding of the changing drugs
phenomenon worldwide.
UNODC, UNAIDS, WHO,
Pompidou Group, MAOC-N,
Interpol, WCO, CICAD, ESPAD
The UK is a member of all the listed
International Organisations and will
have to take charge of the functions
and engagement currently being
conducted by EU agencies.
The UK is a member of all the listed
International Organisations and
will have to take charge of the
functions and engagement
currently being conducted by EU
agencies.
Third  countries For many years, the EMCDDA has cooperated with
candidate and potential candidate countries to the EU. The
current enlargement agenda of the European Union covers
the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro,
Serbia) Turkey and Iceland. The European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) aims to forge closer ties with countries to the
South and East of the European Union (EU). This ENP
framework is open to the EU’s 16 closest neighbours. A
Strategic Partnership based on four Common Spaces is the
framework for relations with Russia, which is not part of
the ENP. It is important to note that it cannot be assumed
that provisions for candidate countries, that are actively
aligning their laws with the EU, cannot be assumed to
apply to a post-Brexit UK, which may  seek to diverge.
Candidate and potential
candidate countries: Algeria,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova,
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Syria, Tunisia,
Ukraine, and Russia.
Engagement with EMCDDA and other
EU agencies could provide a means of
collaboration to allow third country
engagement. Tension between EU
objectives and the UK’s “red lines”
should be expected.
The UK  should start a new process
of  engagement and cooperation
with third countries with the new
devolved powers coming from EU
agencies. This might be possibly
costly in time and resources and it
is  not clear how this will take place
nor what will be the scope of this
engagement.
Reitox  Network Reitox is the European information network on drugs and
drug addiction created at the same time as the EMCDDA.
The abbreviation ‘Reitox’ stands for the French ‘Re´seau
Europe´en  d ´Information sur les Drogues et les
Toxicomanies’. Members of the Reitox network are
designated national institutions or agencies responsible for
data collection and reporting on drugs and drug addiction.
These institutions are called ‘national focal points’ or
‘national drug observatories’. The Regulation governing the
EMCDDA’s work requires that each EU Member State or
other country participating in the work of the Centre shall
establish or designate one national focal point (NFP). This
designated national focal point then becomes a member of
the network, which currently includes each of the 28 EU
Member States plus Norway, the European Commission
and the candidate countries.
EU 28 Member States plus
Norway and candidate
countries: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway
Poland Portugal Romania
Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Sweden Turkey United
Kingdom European
Commission
The national focal points (NFP) are the
cornerstone of the European drug
monitoring and reporting system. On
an annual basis, a NFP should collect
information and produce comparable
and scientiﬁcally sound data on a
national drug situation that will feed
into monitoring the situation across
Europe. In the UK this is done through
the NFP at PHE. In case of a softer
Brexit some agreement could take
place for continued information and
intelligence sharing, with the NFP at
PHE continuing to play a role.
Reitox directly contributes to the
EMCDDA’s core task of collecting
and reporting consistent,
harmonised and standardised
information on the drug
phenomenon across Europe. In the
case of a hard Brexit, with rejection
of European Court of Justice
oversight, and thus participation in
data sharing arrangements, a new
data framework will have to be
negotiated. This could be
challenging as it could restrict the
UK’s stated aim of agreeing other
trade relationships, such as with
the USA, which may  lead to
conﬂicts.
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hich is an information system containing ﬁnger-print information
n asylum seekers and illegal migrants, or the European Criminal
ecords Information System (ECRIS) for third-country citizens cru-
ial in responding to organized crime [4,32]. Europol also operates
he European Information System (EIS), its central criminal infor-
ation and intelligence database, which covers all of Europol’s
andates, including terrorism. It is inconceivable that the UK
ould be granted access to these databases without accepting the
rovisions of EU law. Yet, given the role of organized crime in
he illicit drug trade, some form of British cooperation with the
MCDDA and Europol would seem essential.
A particular concern is access to intelligence on newly devel-
ped drugs. Again, this is an area where European institutions play
n important role. This began in 1997, following the launch of a EU
oint action concerning the information exchange, risk assessment
nd control of new synthetic drugs [33]. This has evolved into the
uropean Union Early Warning System on new psychoactive sub-
tances (EU EWS), in which Europol and EMCDDA play a major role
27]. It provides a means to detect new psychoactive drugs, assess
heir characteristics, and share information to inform decisions of
ember states on measures that they might wish to take. Exclu-
ion from this process would undermine a crucial part of the UK’s
urrent drug strategy.
Other risks arise from exclusion from the EU’s Drugs Action
lans. The 2013–16 Plan sought to scale up monitoring activi-
ies for illicit drug supply in Europe, developing key indicators in
hree domains: drug markets, drug-related crime and drug supply
eduction [34]. This involves work with Europol to develop data
ollection mechanisms to track synthetic drug and cannabis pro-
uction sites and secondary cocaine extraction laboratories, where
ocaine is chemically removed from carrier materials such as plas-
ics or to identify the locations of new batches of synthetics opioids
uch as fentanyl within the EU. The UK also risks exclusion from the
MCDDA collaboration with Europol on implementation of Opera-
ional Action Plans (OAPs). These arose from EU action on organized
nd serious international crime in 2014–17. They are overseen
y the European Council’s Standing Committee on Operational
ooperation on Internal Security (COSI) [35]. The two agencies
lso work together to provide threat assessments and strategic
nalysis of drug markets, reported in a series of joint EMCDDA-
uropol publications [36]. These have included in-depth studies
n methamphetamine, fentanyl and synthetic opioids, synthetic
annabinoids and synthetic cathinones, cocaine and amphetamine.
hey have also produced a series of strategic analyses of the EU drug
arket that provide an overview of drug production, trafﬁcking and
onsumption in Europe, combining the EMCDDA’s structured data
ets with the latest intelligence on organised crime from Europol
36] (Table 1).
As the preceding paragraphs reveals, the scale of collaboration
etween the UK and European institutions in the ﬁeld of illicit drugs
s extensive, even if it has attracted very little media or political
ttention. It is not at all obvious how it might be replicated after
ny transition period given the UK government’s position on key
lements of any future relationship. Yet an alternative framework
f collaboration between the UK and the EU is clearly needed to
acilitate shared and agreed approaches to data sharing and drug
urveillance after Brexit. Beyond the formal institutional arrange-
ents, there are many other collaborations whose loss will create
roblems indirectly in this area [25], such as potential exclusion
rom the EU research programmes and the ERASMUS scheme,
ith consequences for those researching the health implications
f illicit drugs. There is also a threat to other mechanisms that
nable exchanges of personnel and information by statutory and
ivil society groups, the potential loss of skilled EU nationals work-
ng in this area in the EU, and the potential reduction in funding for
hese activities in the light of economic projections by the Ofﬁce forh Policy 123 (2019) 521–525
Budget Responsibility [37]. However, it is not possible to develop
meaningful solutions until the UK can make credible, workable pro-
posals for its future relationships with European institutions and,
in particular, its willingness to accept oversight of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union. Crucially, the problem goes beyond the
UK’s engagement with the EU. Just as in international trade, where
the UK’s exit from the EU will remove it from an estimated 750
agreements with countries in the rest of the world, the UK beneﬁts
from a series of international collaborations with EMCDDA. New
provisions will be required for the UK to continue to participate
in these arrangements and these will take time to agree. A recent
report on the severe challenges facing government departments in
the Brexit process so far gives no grounds for optimism that this
can be achieved [38].
5. Conclusions and overall assessment
So what needs to happen? Firstly, we  have set out a case for
the UK government taking due account of the importance of Euro-
pean networks for surveillance and action on criminal and drug
related activity, and of the impacts on UK civil society if this is
not resolved satisfactorily. In particular the UK Government should
begin to explore how it can continue to participate in the Reitox
network of national focal points (NFP’s).
Once these concessions have been made, the UK Government
can begin to explore how it can continue to participate in the Reitox
network of national focal points (NFPs). The Norwegian and Turk-
ish arrangements offer a useful model for this, although this is only
possible because they do not insist on the “red lines” of the UK
government and have much closer agreements with the EU than
envisaged by the UK’s current (as of March 2019) proposals. How-
ever, if such arrangements prove impossible, the mechanisms for
co-operation with countries of the Western Balkans and some other
neighbouring countries may  offer a partial solution. Of course, this
would mean that the UK will be excluded from any decision-making
processes, but this is a wider problem created by Brexit in every-
thing from ﬁnancial services to intelligence sharing.
The EMCDDA has played a crucial role in enabling EU Member
States to (a) have a strategic, situational and holistic understand-
ing of the European drugs situation and its implications for public
health and security; (b) anticipate, identify and respond at an early
stage to new threats and developments; (c) adopt and implement
effective interventions informed by sound evidence about the situ-
ation and what works; (d) build and evaluate national and European
policies and strategies. The UK has helped, in no small part, to
develop these competencies and capabilities over the last 25 years.
Given the enormous challenges posed by Brexit to almost every
aspect of life in the UK, with attention focused on the seemingly
intractable issues of trade, citizens’ rights, and the Irish border, it is
easy to overlook some of the more specialized areas, of which pol-
icy on illicit drugs is one. Yet at a time when European trade in illicit
drugs is changing rapidly and when the often-fatal consequences of
this trade are seen on the streets of some British cities every week,
this would be a mistake. Government ministers have expressed
their hope that the UK will continue to participate in European
security arrangements. However, contrary to the impression given
by tabloid headlines, the threat posed to the UK goes beyond ter-
rorism, with far more people dying in the UK from drug-related
causes.
Those with day-to-day responsibility, such as the Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police, have stated clearly that this is also
a public health issue. The Government should listen to her. It
has committed, in Parliament, that Brexit will not be allowed to
undermine health. By setting out clear, workable plans to con-
tinue collaboration with the relevant European institutions it has
 Health
a
m
S
m
E
I
o
s
a
f
R
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
emcdda.europa.eu/about/partners/europol.
[37] Ofﬁce for Budget Responsibility. Economic and ﬁscal outlook. London: OBR;
2018.A. Roman-Urrestarazu et al. /
n opportunity to demonstrate that it is serious about that com-
itment.
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